

I. Problem Statement

Overview

American research has shown that one of the most effective uses of police resources for crime prevention is high visibility at crime hotspots. It has also been demonstrated that targeted arrests and problem-orientated policing are all part of police best practice. To reconcile this demand for high visibility and targeted policing with the fact that the police force is at nearly a quarter of the strength (relative to crime) it was 40 years ago, it is necessary to find ways to provide extra support for law enforcement.

Two key crime prevention policing policies emerge from an in-depth review of experience: Law Enforcement needs to be looking at (1) a highly visible police presence, particularly in crime hotspots, and (2) couple the presence with targeted arrests.

Crime In the United States

The 1990s marked the greatest period of crime reduction in American history: Crime rates declined in 47 out of 50 states and in about 190 of the biggest 220 cities. In the popular press much credit for this turn of events has gone to a policing strategy known as "broken windows." Broken windows is a new name for the old idea that police must fight not only overt criminal acts such as murder, robbery, and rape but also disorderly actions such as drinking, graffiti scrawling, and aggressive panhandling. Advocates of the broken-windows approach argue that high levels of disorder create an environment in which criminals, noticing that authorities fail to respond to smaller crimes, assume that more serious crimes will go unpunished as well.¹

The broken window theory

Simply stated the "broken windows" theory of policing is based upon the following premise:

Regardless of how many houses are located on any urban block, the house with a broken window is the most likely - by far - to be the next house to get a smashed window. A broken window in a house causes the house to become a magnet for rocks. Statistically speaking, all houses on a block should have an equal risk for suffering broken windows, but the one that already has a broken window is disproportionately at risk to acquire more.

And so it is for crime. An area with a small amount of even petty crime will attract more criminal activity and it will become more serious over time.

¹ Broken windows reconsidered. . - Review - two books on crime history - book review
Public Interest, Summer, 2002 by Eli Lehrer

The broken windows thesis suggests that the following sequence of events can be expected in deteriorating neighborhoods:

Evidence of decay (accumulated trash, broken windows, deteriorated building exteriors) remains in the neighborhood for a reasonably long period of time. People who live and work in the area feel more vulnerable and begin to withdraw. They become less willing to intervene to maintain public order (for example, to attempt to break up groups of rowdy teens loitering on street corners) or to address physical signs of deterioration.

Sensing this, teens and other possible offenders become bolder and intensify their harassment and vandalism. Residents become yet more fearful and withdraw further from community involvement and upkeep. This atmosphere then attracts offenders from outside the area, who sense that it has become a vulnerable and less risky site for crime.

Sociologists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling first introduced their *Broken Windows* thesis in 1982. It gained immediate attention from academics and policy makers alike. "Broken Windows" finally acknowledged the connection between disorder, fear, crime, and urban decay that has been playing out in America's cities for decades.² The theory argues that minor forms of disorder — such as graffiti, litter, panhandling and prostitution — will, if left unattended, result in an increase in serious criminal activity. **Clean up minor disorder ... and a reduction in major crime will follow.**

The "broken windows" article argued that when low-level quality-of-life offenses were tolerated in a community, more serious crime will follow. According to this view, broken windows, abandoned buildings, public drinking, litter and loitering cause good people to stay in their houses or move out of the neighborhood entirely, leave criminals free to roam and send a message that law violations are not taken seriously. In response, police in cities like New York adopted aggressive *quality of life policing*, in which they arrested thousands of people for low-level offenses and stopped and frisked thousands more. Their motto was, 'We Own The Night'.³

As Mayor Rudolph Giuliani entered his 1997 New York City reelection campaign, his outstanding record on crime may have been his strongest asset in the contest.⁴ His police Chief, William J. Bratton, (now the Los Angeles Police Chief) has built his career on the broken windows theory as an effective crime-fighting technique.

Bratton has been on board the "broken windows" bandwagon for many years. He campaigned for the top job in L.A. on a "broken windows" platform. In October 2002, after being selected to head the Los Angeles Police Department, Bratton told the media he would "make graffiti a top priority for all officers." Bratton identified L.A.'s skid row

² Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities (The Free Press, 1996, Touchstone, 1998) by George Kelling and Catherine Coles.

³ David Cole, and All Things Considered, National Public Radio. SHOW: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (5:00 PM ET) March 7, 2000, Tuesday

⁴ Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities (The Free Press, 1996, Touchstone, 1998) by George Kelling and Catherine Coles.

as one of the main areas where he would ... test "broken windows" policing, and since then, he has aggressively enforced misdemeanor violations in L.A.'s central district.

Over the years, however, "broken windows" policing has been controversial. Many reputable social scientists have suggested that there is no reliable evidence of a "broken windows" effect whatsoever. But Bratton hasn't wavered. Instead he argues that the academics are simply revealing an anti-cop bias. In a National Review Online article Bratton co-authored with Kelling (one of the theory's founders) Bratton wrote:

"What particularly galls police, is that ivory-tower academics — many of whom have never sat in a patrol car, walked or bicycled a beat, lived in or visited regularly troubled violent neighborhoods or collected any relevant data of their own 'on the ground' — cloak themselves in the mantle of an empirical 'scientist' and produce 'findings' indicating that 'broken windows' has been disproved. Worse, they allege that police have had little to do with the declines in crime."

At the heart of the broken windows theory of policing are some very practical, specific policies that research elsewhere in the United States and internationally has shown are effective:

- **Deterrence by increased police presence:** A perceived increase in the likelihood of getting caught by police can deter some offenders from engaging in criminal activity.
- **Patrolling crime hotspots:** A high proportion of crimes are committed in a small area, which can be reduced by police 'making proactive, medium length stops at these locations on a random, intermittent basis'.
- **Targeted arrests:** A large proportion of crimes are also committed by a small number of criminals, so by aiming to take repeat offenders off the street and out of circulation, the crime rate may be reduced.

Zero Tolerance

William Bratton, the first Police Commissioner appointed by Giuliani, used Broken Windows as the cornerstone of initiatives introduced in the NYPD. He expanded on the theory to argue that **individuals who are prepared to commit serious crimes will also disregard laws regulating everyday interactions. In other words, a person that is prepared to commit burglary will probably not be concerned with paying their subway fare.** Often referred to as the introduction of '*zero-tolerance*', these ideas were put into practice with the decision **to clamp down on petty crimes and incivilities.**

Bratton first put this theory into practice while head of the New York City Transit Police between 1990 and 1992. He found that **by targeting fare evaders he was catching criminals with outstanding warrants, which cut subway crime substantially.** When he took over the NYPD, he expanded this to a city wide practice **by targeting minor crimes in an attempt to net the more serious criminals.** When, for instance, people were stopped for fare evasion or were found to be illegally carrying a weapon (namely guns) under stop and search procedures, criminal background checks were automatically done. Larger

numbers of offenders with outstanding warrants were located and arrested under this policy. **Monitoring petty offences allowed the police to identify offenders they had otherwise been unable to locate.**

Do 'Broken Windows' Programs Reduce Major Crime?

Broken Windows Policing⁵

Here is the standard economic problem applied to law enforcement: How should scarce resources be allocated to produce the greatest valued reduction in crime?

The essence of Broken Windows is that minor incivilities (such as drunkenness, begging, vandalism, disorderly behavior, graffiti, litter etc.), if unchecked and uncontrolled, produce an atmosphere in a community or on a street in which more serious crime will flourish. In other words, **crimes flourish because of lax enforcement.**

The prescription for broken windows is to shift policing from major crimes to traditional public order maintenance. As Wilson and Kelling have noted, a great deal was accomplished during this transition, as both police chiefs and outside experts emphasized the crime-fighting function in their plans, in the allocation of resources, and in deployment of personnel. The police may well have become better crime-fighters as a result. And doubtless they remained aware of their responsibility for order. But the link between order-maintenance and crime-prevention, so obvious to earlier generations, was forgotten.

Approximately a decade after the publication of the article, the theory of broken windows was put to practice by the Republican Mayor Rudy Guiliani across New York City. He appointed William Bratton as the Commissioner of the New York Police Department (NYPD) in 1994. The Guiliani-Bratton team honed to perfection a police strategy called Zero Tolerance, which some scholars point out was derived from the Broken Windows theory to tackle the high incidence of crimes in New York City. Bratton explains the theory in his paper *Crime is Down in New York City: Blame the Police*.

The paper lucidly expounds the specific strategy used in fighting street disorder and crimes, which plagued the streets of New York. A close reading of the paper gives one the impression that there was heavy emphasis on concentrated aggression and ruthless prosecution of petty crimes. Bratton chose to focus police action on subway fare evaders and homeless people who lived in the subways of New York. Soon the subways were declared crime free and reclaimed for the benefit of the citizens. Other offenders targeted were jaywalkers, the squeegee men (individuals who cleaned the windshields of cars trapped in traffic snarls and coercing the motorists to pay for their services), panhandlers, drunks, noisy teenagers and streetwalkers.

The aggressive policing included searches, sweeps and arrests of individuals found loitering in streets even though they had not committed any crime under law. There was

⁵ Policing Urban Crimes: The Broken Windows Theory Written by Socrates. Published September 26, 2006

reorganization of the police force by flattening hierarchies and empowering the captains of precincts. Police officers were judged by statistical figures of arrests they made and promotions given. The police forces were expanded significantly from 27,000 (1993) to 41,000 (2001). Information technology was deployed and officers had greater access to computers. There was compilation of crime statistics, sharing of data, which made police deployments to crime-affected areas more effective. Under Bratton, the NYPD became a formidable machine with an offensive outlook on crime and disorder.

There is general agreement among academicians of criminal jurisprudence that crime in New York did drop. Murder decreased by 72% and total violent crimes by 51%. The remarkable turnaround in crime rates were largely seen as attributable to broken windows or its semantic variant, quality-of-life policing adopted by NYPD. Conservative policy makers lauded the efforts of Giuliani and Bratton in cleaning the streets of New York and assertively claimed that other states would do well to follow the Bratton Miracle. The influential Manhattan Institute together with the Giuliani Group has been propagating the policing philosophy to Latin America for curbing urban crimes. In the year 1998 alone police officials from nearly 150 countries visited NYPD to learn about the innovative techniques of crime control.

II. Crime in the City of Anderson Existing Efforts & Current Resources


In the early to mid-nineties violent crime peaked in the City of Anderson, South Carolina. In 1992 and 1993 the city had nine murders each year. With 567 violent crime reports, 1995 was the worst year on record for reported violent crime. In 1996 the department became eligible and applied for Local Law Enforcement Block Grant funds. In early 1997 the department concluded the prerequisites for that type of federal funding and began a grant funded program to decrease the city's violent crime rate. The program was based upon the philosophy of broken windows policing.

From 1997 through 2003, mainly due to the aggressive management of these federal grant funds, the City of Anderson realized significant decreases in violent crime. Fiscal Year 2004 was the first year after 1995 to show an increase, which was slight. Although Fiscal Year 2005 showed a decrease, FY06 indicated a strong increase which, if unabated, threatens a trend to reverse the progress that was made from 1997 – 2003.

The increase in the frequency of violent crime for FY06 is most likely the result of decreased patrols “saturating” the high crime areas of Anderson City. The major reductions in crime between 1997 and 2004 occurred during the years of saturation patrols and increased arrest rates in the City of Anderson. This was the a program aptly named the *Street Level Criminal Apprehension Program*, which had been funded by Local law Enforcement Block Grant funds.

Needs Analysis and Program Activities.

Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Violent Crime. Calendar Year 1995 was the worst year on record for overall violent crime in Anderson City. During CY95 there were 567 written reports of violence in Anderson City as compared to 86 in FY05. For the eight consecutive years ending with FY03, crimes of confrontation decreased yearly and substantially in Anderson. A slight spike occurred in FY04 but was abated in FY05. **Fiscal Year 2006 showed a substantial (54.7%) rise in violent crime in Anderson City. This figure is not within the range of a normal fluctuation.** The police department believes the spike was due to reduced street level operations – the result of decreased block grant funding. Between the years of 1996 – 2006, block grant funding to combat crime in Anderson City ranged from a high of \$147,569 in 1998 to a low of \$13,791 in FY06. As depicted by the following chart, the projected violent crime figures for FY07 will reverse a decade-long trend and move us substantially backward toward our mid-nineties starting point. The chart shows that the number of reported violent crimes for the six month period ending December 31, 2006, exceeds the total number of reported violent crimes in the entire previous (12-month) fiscal year. Also note the moving averages that decreased significantly subsequent to the city’s eligibility for Local Law Enforcement Block Grant funds, beginning in 1997:



The major block-grant-funded and street-level-operations were in the years leading up to 2003. Although some street level operations have continued, the decreased funding for the program has significantly reduced the scope of the program. The program began in calendar year 1997. The data in this report for street level operations was unavailable for

years prior to 1999. In 2004 the number of hours worked and persons arrested nose-dived, rising slightly in 2005 & then bottoming out in 2006. The following table depicts the street level performance from 1999 – 2006.⁶

<u>Fiscal Yr</u>	<u>Grant Hrs</u>	<u>Grant Charges</u>	<u>Avg Hrs. per Charge</u>	<u># Persons</u>	<u>Avg Hrs. per Arrest</u>
1999	4,916.00	443.00	11.10	321.00	15.31
2000	3,557.50	297.00	11.98	211.00	16.86
2001	5,759.50	1,473.00	3.91	882.00	6.53
2002	3,613.00	735.00	4.92	436.00	8.29
2003	3,604.50	716.00	5.03	447.00	8.06
2004	2,048.00	424.00	4.83	262.00	7.82
2005	2,176.50	634.00	3.43	364.00	5.98
2006	2,096.50	377.00	5.56	227.00	9.24
Grand Total*	27,771.50	5,099.00	5.45	3,150.00	<u>8.82</u>

*Average # of arrest charges per person: 1.62


With respect to productivity, by comparison, according to page 32 of the *City of Anderson Police Department Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Report*, all 87 sworn personnel of the City of Anderson Police Department made a total of 2,707 criminal charges in FY06, arresting approximately 1,671 persons.⁷ That would be an average of 19.2 arrestees per person. Divided by 2080 hours per year it comes to 108.3 hours per arrest. That is 12.28 times the 8.82 hours per arrest for the participants in the Street Level Criminal Apprehension Program. Clearly, with respect to law enforcement, the Street Level Program provides a strong bang for the buck. Basically, statistically and numerically, if the street level program performance figures were applied to regular policing, there would be one arrest for each sworn personnel on the entire police force for (almost) every eight-hours worked by each of those sworn officers.

The murder rate for the City of Anderson has decreased substantially since it peaked at nine per year in 1992 and 1993. The change in the murder rate for the City of Anderson shows a change which corresponds with that of the overall violent crime rate. The following chart depicts the yearly number of murders in Anderson City for the 16-year period ending with FY06, the overall average and three moving averages. It also shows the actual number of murders that occurred for the first half of FY07 (July 1 – December 31, 2006) and the projected murder rate for FY07.⁸

⁶ Figures regarding grant-arrest-records and grant-hours-worked are from 1/6/99 to 4/23/06.

⁷ 1,671 persons arrested based upon approximate 1.62 charges per person.

⁸ Chart figures through FY06 taken from the City of Anderson Police Department Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Report. P 13.



The City of Anderson Police Department routinely analyzes criminal activity and crime rates to understand the crime trends for particular areas. Special attention is given to reports of violent crime, drugs, and illegal weapons because previous research has established a nexus among these criminal components and also between these crimes and other types of criminal activity, both violent and non-violent.⁹ These reports and arrests are periodically mapped in order to visually demonstrate where the “pockets” of crime exist within the community. This form of crime mapping is and has always been the point of focus for the **Street Level Criminal Apprehension Program**. This program has resulted in the arrest of hundreds of criminal offenders since the spring of 1997 and the violent crime rate in the City of Anderson showed a substantial decrease during the same period.

On Thursday, September 30, 2004, during a Public Safety Meeting attended by the City of Anderson Police Department’s top management, The Chief and Captains of the police department reported the performance of the Street Level Criminal Apprehension Program to the City Manager, Assistant City Manager and the members of city council who serve on the Public Safety Committee. The following is a summary of the program’s performance since 1999, as described to the Public Safety Committee on September 30, 2004, from 17:00 – 19:30 (EST) by Chief C. D. McConnell, Captain Jack Sanders and Captain Kevin Marsee.

- From 1999 – fiscal year 2004, 4276 charges were filed against criminal offenders by officers working under the grant-funded Street Level Criminal Apprehension Program.
- The 4,276 charges were approximately 1/3 of all charges that were filed by the entire department during those years.


⁹ Research indicates that illegal weapons, drugs, and violent crime are correlated. In addition, these types of crimes occur disproportionately in conjunction with many other types of crime(s).

- There was a small spike in the violent crime rate in FY04 due to reduced funding.
- 24,040 man-hours were worked under the grant-funded Street Level Criminal Apprehension Program since 1999.

While the calls-for-service to the police department have generally increased on an annual basis, the actual documented crime, especially violent crime, has typically decreased during the years wherein the City of Anderson Police Department received significant block grant funding. The premises behind the City of Anderson Police Department’s programs to control violent crime are:

1. Violent crime is controllable and
2. Decreasing violent crime in a particular environment can be achieved through
 - a. modifying the environment by limiting the opportunities for people to commit crime, and/or
 - b. pro-actively arresting, convicting, and incarcerating offenders, thereby removing the perpetrators of crime from the environment.

The police department’s approach toward crime suppression is focused on getting maximum results for the amount of time and money invested (i.e. “Delivering the biggest bang for the buck”). The department’s crime control and prevention programs are based upon the following model of criminal behavior:




According to the theory behind this model, in order to affect the criminal’s actions, law-enforcement must act upon at least one of the three motivators in the model. The City of Anderson Police Department concentrates on removing the criminal’s *ability* to commit crimes and therefore affects the other two components as well. Some of the premises of the theory are as follows:

1. The vast majority of people is hardworking and law abiding citizens.

2. Criminals comprise a small percentage of the population.
3. All crime is committed by criminals.
4. Criminals commit statistically more minor offenses than major and/or violent offenses.
5. Criminals frequent well-defined common areas wherein they feel comfortable.

Analyzing moving crime trends and adjusting law-enforcement's response accordingly results in an increased incarceration rate for the criminal element. This effectively removes the criminal from society and decreases society's overall violent crime rate. An analogy of this theory and its societal model is as follows: Consider that roughly 3% of society is criminal¹⁰. The other 97% are law abiding. The following model of criminals and crime in society emerges. Theoretically, the circle on the left is the entire population of any jurisdiction and the circle on the right is all of the crime that occurs in that same area.

SOCIETAL MODEL OF CRIME



Zero-tolerance for crime leads to numerous arrests for minor (petty) offenses. The criminals' ability to further victimize the community through more violent acts is adversely affected by incarceration.


By concentrating on the criminal element and incarcerating a maximum number of offenders, the crime rate is subsequently decreased because (1) the criminals' ability to

¹⁰ 3% criminal and 97% law abiding are generally considered average figures.

commit crime has been eliminated, (2) the increased risk deters some lesser motivated criminals from acting, and (3) criminal opportunity is decreased when offenders are jailed. As offenders serve time for lesser offenses, they are unable, through lack of opportunity, to violently infringe upon the community.

Based upon these premises, the City of Anderson Police Department has enacted specific programs directed at apprehending criminal offenders. By mapping crime and concentrating police department resources – human, equipment, and financial – in specific areas where the biggest opportunity for improvement exists, management can strategically displace criminal activity.

During FY05 reports of criminal victimization decreased to 3,935, the lowest point on record. That year was the first complete fiscal year that the department had its new computer-based incident reporting system inline. During FY05, a total of 15,371 incidents were documented on the 3,835 reports.¹¹ The following graph depicts the number of written criminal incident reports for the last 15 years. Note the immediate and drastic change that occurred in 1997, the first year of **Street Level Operations**, which were funded by the LLEBG:¹²




Similar to the change in the yearly number of murders and violent criminal incident reports, the number of calls for service changed significantly after 1997. The reason for the increase in calls-for-service is due largely to officers being assigned to saturate high crime areas.

The following graph displays the change in the average number of calls-per-day-per-year since calendar year 1993. Adjustments have been taken for leap years.

¹¹ Includes non-criminal incidents that were recorded on reports.

¹² Chart taken from the City of Anderson Police Department Fiscal Year 2005 Annual Report. Page 12.



III. Conclusion

Each year that the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant funds were available to the City of Anderson Police Department, the agency employed the **Street Level Criminal Apprehension Program in an effort to suppress crime thereby improving the quality of life in and around the City of Anderson, South Carolina.** As depicted by the previous charts, the funding has been applied toward programs that have had a **direct and measurable impact on criminal activity.** The department is seeking to continue this type of funding through the Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program in an effort to continue to suppress the violent crime rate in and around the City of Anderson, South Carolina. Officers who are employed to work overtime under this grant will continue to work closely with personnel who have been or who are currently employed under other grant programs. This level of cooperation lends support to the department's efforts to further identify needs within the community that require a pro-active law enforcement response.

Currently the City of Anderson employs three Patrol Shifts with two teams each, an Investigative Services Division (ISD - criminal investigations), a Narcotics Division (drug investigations), and Community Patrol. The department also has a grant-funded Gang Initiative Investigator. Each operational area - Uniformed Patrol, Community Patrol, ISD and Vice/Narcotics - works together in a responsible and professional manner in order to promote an environment in which all citizens will be able to live peacefully, work diligently, enjoy recreational activities, and be safe from threat of harm. The City

of Anderson Police Department's management believes that with continued funding, the Street Level Criminal Apprehension Program will be able to once again contain and reduce violent crime in the City of Anderson.

Hiring the number of additional full-time officers required to provide shift patrol services to effectively decrease the crime rate in Anderson to a manageable level would be cost prohibitive to the City of Anderson Police Department. However, the same reduction in crime can be realized by aggressively managing overtime resources and focusing on the core crime issues in the city. This would be accomplished via a geographical approach to crime control, utilizing the broken window theory of crime control combined with a "zero-tolerance" approach. The effective use of overtime pay for experienced officers who are focused and have pre-planned to target persons who have a criminal mindset can achieve the same reduction in crime as full time personnel costing approximately 12.28 times as much. This has been proven in the past with the use of Local Law Enforcement Block Grant funds.

Funding for overtime to focus on "hot spots" in the City of Anderson would result in a higher arrest rate and an increased number of prosecutions for all crimes and a decrease in the violent crime rate for the city and surrounding areas starting in fiscal year 2008. By increasing the arrest rate **future occurrences of violent criminal activity in Anderson City and the surrounding area would be reduced also**, as the department will be removing bad role-models from society, taking murderers, rapists, burglars and robbers off the streets. Unfortunately, police department funding through the general revenue is projected to stay at its current level for at least a few more years thus precluding the department from continuing its overtime program without outside funding.

If the Justice Assistance Grant Proposal is funded, the City of Anderson Police Department will use the award to fund overtime for officers who will work to decrease crime in targeted areas. **The additional manpower provided by overtime will enable us to focus on the hottest crime spots in the area, arrest more violent & nonviolent perpetrators and decrease the crime rate due to the fact that many crooks will be incarcerated and/or too paranoid to misbehave.**

